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Abstract 
 
In debates between holism and reductionism in biology, from the early 20
th
 century to 
more recent re-enactments involving genetic reductionism, developmental systems 
theory, or systems biology, the role of chance – the presence of theories invoking 
chance as a strong explanatory principle – is hardly ever acknowledged. Conversely, 
Darwinian models of chance and selection (Dennett 1995, Kupiec 1996, Kupiec 
2009) sit awkwardly with reductionist and holistic concepts, which they alternately 
challenge or approve of. I suggest that the juxtaposition of chance and the holism-
reductionism pair (at multiple levels, ontological and methodological, pertaining to 
the vision of scientific practice as well as to the foundations of a vision of Nature, 
implicit or explicit) allows the theorist to shed some new light on these perennial 
tensions in the conceptualisation of Life. 
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Interest shifts . . . from an intelligence that shaped things once for all 
to the particular intelligences which things are even now shaping 
(Dewey 1910/2007, 10) 
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Introduction 
 
The juxtaposition of chance with the more familiar pair of holism and reductionism 
in biology may at first sight seem rather surprising. Chance is both an ancient philosophical 
problem, as addressed – quite differently – by Aristotle, Lucretius or Diderot (Gigandet 
2002, Wolfe 2010c, Pépin, this issue); a concept closely linked to the emergence of ‘modern’ 
biology, from Darwin to the study of genetic mutations; today it is discussed in a new way 
on both the experimental and theoretical planes, particularly in the more manipulable form of 
stochasticity (Kupiec et al. 2009, Kupiec 2010). Holism is a term that always carries with it a 
residual dimension of mystery, referring initially to a set of positions that goes back to 
Aristotle and Hegel, then – most relevantly for our topic here – to a position in theoretical 
biology inspired by general systems theory (Smuts 1926/1999, Ash 1995); inn a more 
existential sense, it is also associated with the ‘organicism’ of Kurt Goldstein (Goldstein 
1934/1995). Holism has also been revived more recently in analytic philosophy with Robert 
Brandom and John McDowell (for recent analyses of holism in metaphysics, philosophy of 
mind and the philosophy of language see Esfeld 1999 and Block 1998). But for our purposes 
‘holism’ is a certain type of claim about how specifically living beings – organisms overall, 
but particularly live ones – should be considered as wholes, even if there is no rigorous, 
clear-cut distinction or relation between holism, systems theory and specifically organismic 
claims about the uniqueness of living beings.
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Briefly put, models appealing to chance are (philosophically) anti-essentialist: they 
reject the appeal to higher-level, irreducible properties of a system by retracing the causal 
process which generated them, based on stochastic processes. It seems intuitively right – and 
empirically indeed to be the case – that models favouring the role of chance tend to be 
compatible with reduction, or reductionism as an ontological and/or explanatory position 
according to which for any given Whole there will always be subjacent components which 
                                                 
1
 The ‘classic’ authors Smuts, von Neumann and von Bertalanffy all waver in between statements of holism as 
a total systemic standpoint (with no particular reference to a special status for living entities) and holism as an 
approach or model which sheds particular light on embryology and how organisms are not mere machines 
(with reference to teleology and the ‘historical’ or ‘learned’ character of organisms). These authors also specify 
abstract terms on which ‘merely mechanical aggregates’ are different from genuine wholes, including chemical 
compounds, and then suddenly specify that biological organisms are the exemplars of “creative wholes,” as 
Smuts calls them (wholes which create structures different from their constituents or parts) (Smuts 1926/1999, 
140-141). The best general discussion of holism in early twentieth-century science is Ash 1995. See also 
Peterson 2010, which is forthcoming in book form from Springer (Series in History, Philosophy and Theory of 
the Life Sciences). 
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themselves can explain, with or without ‘bonuses’ such as bridge laws or structural features, 
the overall function of this Whole. But little attention has been paid to this relation between 
chance, anti-essentialism and reduction. 
For instance, a Darwinian model of chance and selection (Dennett 1995, Kupiec 
1996) seems to be in conflict with a systemic holism as put forth in Varela and his partisans 
(Weber and Varela 2002, Rudrauf et al. 2003), who tend to insist on the irreducible 
individuality of systems (or worse, a metaphysics of Life) rather than their production 
through stochastic processes, or similarly in the work of Rosen which tends to posit the 
existence of a foundational centre or Self in living systems (Wolfe 2010b). In contrast, this 
postulate seems absent from the work of Moreno and his collaborators (Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 
2000), which shows that it is possible to articulate an organisational – and hence weakly 
holistic – model without adjoining it to the individualism or anti-Darwinism of a Varela 
(Bechtel 2007). I suggest that the juxtaposition of chance with the holism-reductionism pair 
(at multiple levels, ontological and methodological, pertaining to the vision of scientific 
practice as well as to the foundations of a vision of Nature, implicit or explicit) allows the 
theorist to shed some new light on these perennial tensions in the conceptualisation of Life. 
 
1. 
When we think of the role of chance in biology – the presence of chance, or more 
restrictively, ‘stochastic processes’ as productive in biology (and I leave aside the question, 
‘productive of what?’ – of order? of particular organisms? of structures enabling the 
generation of organisms? – in order to merely stress: the idea that a chance and selection 
model is productive) we often think of Darwin. We can augment his ideas of variation and 
natural selection (in which chance plays the role of producing what sort of variation will 
occur in organisms living in a given environment, on which natural selection will then act) 
with later developments such as random mutations, genetic drift – the idea that most genetic 
variation we observe at the molecular level is not to be accounted for in terms of selection, 
but rather as a consequence of mutation and (random) genetic drift (Kimura 1983), etc. At 
that point one will typically enter into a ‘more or less’ discussion: is a particular factor 
decisive or not? Are its effects real or apparent? How many of these effects make a cause the 
cause of a phenomenon? But if we consider instead the attitudes towards the concept of 
chance within a schematic summary of the history of philosophy, in addition to debates 
about whether the world is the product of necessity or chance (with a predominant denial 
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that chance can serve as any sort of explanatory factor: to give just one example, when 
Aristotle discusses how it is that organisms come to be as organized, stable wholes, he 
clearly states, “organic development is either for the sake of something [i.e. according to a 
final cause, CW] or by chance; it is not by chance (since chance outcomes are irregular 
whereas organic outcomes regular); therefore organic development is for the sake of 
something”; Aristotle 1984, II.8, 198b34-199b7), we find a different feature: a distinctly 
radical dimension of chance. The latter attitude is radical in the sense that it is destructive or 
at least deflationary: it says, ‘show me a complex phenomenon A and I will show you how 
chance / variation-and-selection / stochastic processes B have produced it’. 
Thinkers such as Lucretius, Diderot, more recently Daniel Dennett and – centrally to 
this essay – Jean-Jacques Kupiec have actively insisted on the role of chance or a 
fundamental randomness at the heart of nature, as either ‘productive of order’ or in any case 
a more basic, ‘genuine’ level of reality than the perceived forms and species of our 
experience. Conversely, numerous other thinkers of some eminence (Aristotle and Kant 
come to mind) have warned against the dangers of a theory which grants such a productive 
and fundamental role to chance, in the name of the stability or integrity of Forms, of the 
organism (as in Hans Jonas, e.g. Jonas 1966, 74-92), or of the person: if, so these thinkers 
argue, we open the door to explanations by chance, then none of the entities we depend on 
for a meaningful life can remain. . In all cases here, what is at issue is chance as a feature of 
the world, not as a feature of our knowledge conditions What happens if we try and confront 
these aspects of the history of philosophy, with some key moments in theoretical biology? 
The confrontation reveals a certain instability or, differently put, a degree of conceptual 
incommensurability. That is, the introduction of chance renders the traditional opposition 
between holism and reductionism more unstable – less clear-cut. 
We are familiar with various forms of this opposition, particularly, as regards the 
present context, that between holism as the insistence on the irreducible organizational 
dimension of systems (whether in the sense of autopoiesis, the more recent Developmental 
Systems Theory or DST, as in Oyama 1985/2000, or the role of development which ‘trumps’ 
reductive genetic explanations), and reductionism as a series of factually rather distinct 
possible claims: that ‘you are your biochemistry’ (Loeb 1912), that one should focus on 
reduction towards the molecular level (molecular biology or cellular neuroscience rather 
than cognitive neuroscience, Bickle 2006), or towards the genetic level (Monod, Dawkins, 
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Dennett, etc.). But it should be clear that in fact they are not logical opposites; the opposition 
is less monolithic than it seems. Even a classic of genetic reductionism like Monod can move 
within one sentence from proclaiming genetic reductionism, “Thus defined, the theory of the 
genetic code is the fundamental basis of biology” to a much more flexible position, with 
anti-determinist or at least non-determinist tones: “this does not mean, of course, that the 
complex structures and functions of organisms can be deduced from [the theory of the 
genetic code], nor even that they are always directly analysable on the molecular level” 
(Monod 1970, 12 ; Monod 1971, xii). Again, there is no real contradiction here, especially if 
we consider that there is a difference between the claim of genetic determinism and that of 
genetic reductionism: the latter is a more flexible claim. As Gayon suggests, genetic 
reductionism “does not claim that genes wholly determine the genesis of organismic traits, 
but that the explanation of these traits must significantly include genetic factors.” On this 
view, “the best explanation of a biological trait is that which specifies the way in which 
genes determine this trait in a given organismic and environmental context” (Gayon 
2009/2011, 81/117).  Reduction here is neither a strict ontological claim about what is real 
and what should be eliminated from our vision of Nature, nor a strict nomological claim 
about inter-theoretic reduction between sets of laws. It is, Gayon suggests, more of a 
heuristic claim about how to account for a biological phenomenon. 
Conversely, organisational models are not adverse to defining the systems that 
compose the organisational wholes in which they are interested, in a mechanistic fashion 
(whether or not this is overtly reductionist; Bickle 2006, 430; Bechtel 2007, 270). That is, 
organisational models essentially articulate together key insights from mechanistic science 
and the holistic or ‘organismic’ critiques of mechanism. More precisely, they combine the 
mechanistic explanatory programme to study (by reduction, modeling and componential 
analysis) the structures at work in organisms, and the organicist (holist) standpoint which 
minimally “remind[s] mechanists of the shortfalls of the mechanistic accounts on offer,” for 
ideas such as “negative feedback, self-organising positive feedback, and cyclic organisation 
are critical to explaining the phenomena exhibited by living organisms” (Bechtel 2007, 296-
297). Differently put, “system thinking does not imply forgetting about the material 
mechanisms that are crucial to trigger off a biological type of phenomenon/behavior; rather, 
it means putting the emphasis on the interactive processes that make it up, that is, on the 
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dynamic organization in which biomolecules (or, rather, their precursors) actually get 
integrated” (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004, 238). 
But what of chance? It enables us to move away from the constant back-and-forth 
between reductionist models and more holistic models (strict genetic inheritance versus 
ecological inheritance, selfish genes versus organisms, genomics versus Evo-Devo and so 
on), in a kind of ‘triangulation’. What Kupiec called ‘cellular Darwinism’ and now more 
expansively is calling ‘ontophylogenesis’ (a term somewhat reminiscent of Buss 1987, who 
also felt that evolutionary accounts of phylogenesis needed to be supplemented with 
accounts of ontogenesis, the emergence of individuals; Kupiec’s idea is to be more 
Darwinian than Darwin, and explain, not just the origin of species but the origin of 
individuals through variation and selection; see summary in Laplane 2011) is as different 
from classic genetic reductionism as it is from the classic anti-reductionist positions which 
he suspects are too holistic (using the term in a more pejorative sense to mean views which 
are insufficiently grounded in experimental science). Indeed, instead of treating them as 
binary opposites, Kupiec finds these positions to be complementary types of mistakes: 
Since genetic determinism is reductionist, holism would at first sight seem to be 
incompatible with it. Nevertheless, the two concepts unite in affirming the objective 
reality of order. In both cases a first principle is involved which structures the world 
and directs processes. In genetic determinism, the principle of order from order 
comes into play through the stereospecificity of the molecules, while in holism, the 
creative principle, less well defined and with a variety of names, creates organised 
wholes (Kupiec 2009, 77). 
 
I’ll return in closing to the challenge presented here towards any strong notion of order, but 
for now wish to focus more on where this view fits in relation to these ‘mistaken positions’ it 
challenges. 
 
2. 
Curiously, if we map out these positions in theoretical biology, they bear a striking 
resemblance to the landscape in contemporary moral philosophy – specifically regarding 
freedom versus determinism.  A brief comparison should make this obvious. In analytic 
philosophy, the basic positions in the debate over whether we are free agents or simple parts 
of a deterministic universe, are usually presented as follows (with each of these obviously 
coming in different forms, weak or strong, pure or hybrid, etc.): 
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A: libertarianism (not to be confused with the political or economic doctrines which 
bear this name). Morally, this is the view that we are absolutely free, that agents respond to 
reasons, not causes, and are self-governing (rather than influenced by their genes, their 
environment, or what they had for breakfast). The libertarian may or may not accept that 
Nature is governed by causal processes, but she asserts that our existence as moral agents has 
nothing to do with these forms of causality. Biologically, this corresponds to a view found in 
German Idealist philosophy of nature (e.g. Hegel’s), but also in Hans Jonas, in Varela and 
other thinkers calling either for a return to Aristotelianism or to a Romantic conception of 
Nature. They believe that ‘Life’ is entirely separate from physical science. There may or may 
not be a possible science of life on this view, but if there is, it will not resemble the science 
of Monod and Jacob, but rather that of Driesch, the Baldwin effect and Margulis. 
Sometimes, however, these take the form of a more sophisticated, less metaphysically laden 
view which is still a form of organicism, without necessarily being what Monod and Kupiec 
call ‘animism’: for instance, the distinguished theorist of developmental systems, Susan 
Oyama, speaks of “the organism as layered vital reality,” and insists on “the organism as a 
locus of agency” (Oyama 1985/ 2000, 162; Oyama 2000, 95).2 
B: determinism is the most straightforward case here, in morals as in biological 
thought. It is the idea, whether or not we take it in its specifically Laplacian form, that there 
is a kind of grid on which all things are located (or more metaphysically, a grid including all 
future possibilities), such that causal, or mechanical, or atomic concepts exhaustively 
account for the behaviour of all such entities. Morally, it is the absolute opposite of the idea 
of freedom in the sense that I am the originator of my actions; scientifically, it supports the 
idea that there are absolute correspondences, whether between genes and behaviour, or laws 
of physics, etc. In early modern thought, when Hobbes claims that everything is matter and 
motion, including the thoughts in my head, this is a ‘necessitarian’ (determinist) view. 
Biologically, the most pure statement of determinism is to say that the phenotype is the 
expression of the genotype. 
                                                 
2
 Elementary fairness leads me to specify that Oyama herself explicitly states that her position weakens the 
postulate common to what she calls – in a partly metahistorical way – preformationism and epigenesis, namely, 
the postulate that matter cannot acquire a biological form without there being an external source of this form. 
But it seems more interesting to me to present the tensions between ‘sophisticated’, nuanced theorists than 
between caricatural, dogmatic ones. 
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C: compatibilism is the most complex and the most interesting position, both in 
moral thought, where it involves recognising a degree of determinism while also arguing that 
we have what Dennett called some ‘elbow room’ within a deterministic universe. Spinoza’s 
idea that the more I come to be aware of the causal processes within me and without me, the 
freer I am, is a compatibilist idea. The idea that I am governed by my beliefs, desires and 
conditioning rather than strictly by laws of physics (a view held by Hume, Moritz Schlick 
and A.J. Ayer amongst others) is a compatibilist idea. What is the analog to compatibilism in 
the biological sphere? Precisely, the anti-essentialist privileging of chance (Lucretius, 
Diderot, Darwin, Dewey, Kupiec), which recognises the existence of causality without 
defending causal fundamentalism (a pluralism of causes, then). Indeed, to the criticism 
which might say, if we simply replace traditional essences by another concept called 
‘chance’, aren’t we still being essentialists?, one can reply that in both Darwin and Kupiec, 
chance, variation and selection are all factors
3
:  
Each cell, although working for its own good, is subordinate to the whole. It does not 
enjoy total freedom as its freedom is limited in that the cell is constrained to 
differentiate in a way appropriate to the place it occupies in the society of cells 
(Kupiec 2009, 124) 
 
And of course if we think back to Claude Bernard, who popularized the term ‘determinism’ 
in the first place (Gayon 2009/2011; Pépin 2012), there is not even an analogy, for Bernard 
makes a literal usage of ‘freedom’ and ‘determinism’ as descriptions both of biological 
entities and of methodological rules for dealing with such entities. Like Jacques Loeb in the 
early 20
th
 century, Bernard seeks to give analytic, mechanistic accounts of living systems 
while at the same time doing justice to their integrative features. But with respect to anti-
essentialism, the idea is that position (C), which in moral philosophy would be 
compatibilism, here in biological theory amounts to the rejection both of genocentric 
essentialism, and of holistic, systemic essentialism.  
 
3. 
This anti-essentialism entails, or rather is expressed crucially in the fact that, notably 
unlike Schrödinger in What is Life? (to name a famous, and perhaps foundational example; 
Schrödinger 1944), Kupiec does not recognize the existence of something like a program; 
                                                 
3
 However, Kupiec approvingly cites the neural Darwinism of Changeux, then Edelman, which precisely seems 
to make the mistake of re-essentialising Darwinism as an explanatory principle (Kupiec 2009, 106). 
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“Because of the stochastic nature of protein interaction and gene expression, [Kupiec] says, 
there can be no Aristotelian form or program to give order to life and ward off entropic 
chaos and death” (Werner 2009, 35). Overall, the argument founded on chance and selection 
is anti-essentialist per definitionem because the primacy of chance over structure is the exact 
opposite of the Aristotelian insistence on the primacy of form over matter (Kupiec 1999). 
Evolution is not an essentialist business, for species are populational constructs (and 
organisms are not essence either, Wolfe 2010b). On a more pragmatic level, we can say with 
Ereshefsky that “Positing biological essences does not illuminate biological practice, nor 
does it help us understand how science works” (Ereshefsky 2010, 684). But Kupiec’s claim 
is stronger:  
modern biology is still impregnated with pre-scientific essentialism, hindering its 
development. This essentialism presents the Form as the prime entity and one that it 
seems impossible to go beyond, and gives rise to the contradiction in genetic 
determinism. We shall see that this impasse originates in the belief we have in the 
reality of the species. We are blinded by what seems absolutely obvious, and this 
leads us to see the species as the insurmountable horizon of biological thought 
(Kupiec 2009, 177).  
 
And this puts us on a metaphysical plane, which enables me to relate Kupiec’s ‘Darwinian’ 
anti-essentialism to a more strictly philosophical cousin, Althusser’s ‘Lucretian’ anti-
essentialism. If Lucretius believed that the world was made up of atoms and their random 
swerves – which introduces a dimension of chance into what was otherwise a fairly static 
view of atomism – the late Althusser, in his posthumously published writings, speaks of a 
“materialism of the encounter,” where the latter term refers to the sudden ‘encounter’ 
between atoms originally described by Epicurus and Lucretius: 
the encounter doesn’t create any of the reality of the world, which is nothing but 
agglomerated atoms, but it grants reality to the atoms themselves, which without the 
deviation and encounter would be nothing but abstract elements, without any tangible 
existence. The atoms’ very existence is dependent on the deviation and the encounter 
(Althusser 1994, 541-542).
4
 
 
There are no essences here, no Platonic forms or first principles (like Aristotle’s noûs – 
‘mind’ or ‘intellect’ – which is prior to all contingent natural forms: “since nothing which is 
accidental is prior to what is per se, it is clear that no accidental cause can be prior to a cause 
per se. Spontaneity and chance, therefore, are posterior to noûs and nature”; Aristotle 1984, 
II.6, 198a7-10); there are encounters and their effects. 
                                                 
4
 For English translations see Althusser 2006, and for extensive commentary see Bourdin 2005. 
10 
 
But the specifically biological anti-essentialism also makes a different point: that 
information itself is a kind of essence. Here the criticism is quite similar to that of, e.g. Susan 
Oyama, who writes that “when atheistic evolutionists deify information they seem to lack the 
courage of their materialist convictions” (Oyama 2009, 43). But if we recall my distinction 
between the three basic positions A, B and C, Oyama’s critique of the informational model 
of the gene belonged to (A), which opposed the intrinsic features of living beings to the 
‘disembodied’ character of information (a criticism of a view as disembodied means the 
position argued for belongs to the family of theories defending ‘embodiment’, as discussed 
e.g. in Shapiro 2007). In contrast, ‘cellular Darwinism’ makes no claims about the 
uniqueness of organisms faced with the rest of the physical world. 
Granted, not all the criticisms of ‘disembodiment’ belong to that shopworn category, 
‘mysterious vitalism’ (while in any case vitalism exists and has existed in far more varied 
forms than biologists or philosophers of biology ever seem to notice; Oyama 2010, Wolfe 
2011). That is, Oyama and others can state that the obsession with information theory dating 
back to Schrödinger leads people to lose sight of key features of, say, development, without 
this statement at all invoking mysterious, extra-causal forces like entelechies – although a 
prominent theorist of embodiment and former collaborator of Varela’s, Evan Thompson, 
does reintroduce the metaphysical crispation that one might have hoped to have dispensed 
with, when he argues that “Life is not physical in the standard materialist sense of purely 
external structure and function. Life realizes a kind of interiority, the interiority of selfhood 
and sense-making” (Thompson 2007, 238). But Kupiec’s criticism is different. When he 
criticizes genetics for its vision of ontogenesis as a unidirectional process leading from DNA 
to the phenotype (the expression of genetic information), he does so in the name of 
Darwinism, in that sense challenging the integrity of the Modern Synthesis (Kupiec and 
Sonigo 2000, 88; Schaeffer 2007, 173). 
Both Darwin and Claude Bernard are inspirations for this anti-essentialist attitude 
towards the status of biological entities, which are de-substantialized here (as discussed in 
the ‘five arguments’ which open Chapter 2 of Kupiec 2009), or processualized. A key 
moment here was Lewontin’s work, in which the organism becomes a porte-manteau 
concept, a place-holder in between gene, population and ecosystem (which themselves are 
strictly processual concepts as well); there is no privileging of any particular unit of selection 
as more ‘real’ or ‘irreducible’ than any other, in a selection process which involves nothing 
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other than phenotypic variation, differential phenotypic fitnesses (depending on 
environments), and the heritability of fitness (Lewontin 1970, 1); “just as there is no 
organism without an environment, so there is no environment without an organism” 
(Lewontin 1983/1985, 99). Because after all if we maintain, on a substantialist view, that 
organisms are something special – norganisms, in Julian Huxley’s ironic phrase describing 
Haldane’s reaction to his own mechanist views5 – we are guilty, or may be guilty, of 
“spiritualising matter,” to borrow an expression from the 18th century materialist philosopher 
La Mettrie (like what Kupiec calls ‘animism’). In the first pages of his notorious work 
L’Homme-Machine, La Mettrie charged that Leibnizians “with their Monads, . . . have 
spiritualised matter rather than materialising the soul” (La Mettrie 1748/1960, 149), the irony 
being that precisely some of these versions of the Leibnizian monads, turned into 
‘molecules’ or ‘seeds of matter’, in fact became, notably in Maupertuis, early theories of 
genetic information (Wolfe 2010a). Animism, spiritualising matter, mysterious embodiment: 
all of these are more or less identified in Kupiec’s deflationary, Darwinian perspective 
which, as I shall discuss in closing, puts him closer to the reductionist standpoint. 
 
4. 
 I suggested earlier that my proposed triangulation between holism, reductionism and 
chance produces some curious effects. Indeed, from Lucretius to Diderot, Darwin, and 
Tyndall
6
 and onto Dennett and Kupiec, the type of biological theory that asserts the primacy 
of chance is reductionist in the sense that it rejects the existence of all irreducible totalities 
(including notions of design and order), without however being identical with classic forms 
of reductionism – which are historically diverse: Cartesian mechanism, biochemically 
inspired ‘vulgar materialism’ in the nineteenth century (Vogt, Büchner) or the revival of 
atomism, as stated for instance by Emil Du Bois-Reymond:  
                                                 
5
 “Dr. Haldane called himself an organicist, which implied being anti-mechanist and yet not a mystic vitalist –   
I never quite grasped what he really meant. At any rate it led to some passages at arms. As I was describing 
some experiment which demanded a mechanistic explanation, he burst out with ‘But it's a norganism, my dear 
young fellow, a norganism’!” (Huxley 1971, 138). 
6
 John Tyndall (1820-1893) was an ideologist of Darwinism who in 1874 gave a very influential lecture at the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science in Belfast – thereafter known as the ‘Belfast Address’ 
(Tyndall 1874) – arguing for science against religion, but also making specific points about evolutionary theory 
and its impact on our thinking, as a demystifying force against teleology and other ideas; very much what 
Dennett was to describe as a “universal acid” (Dennett 1995, 63f.). 
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Natural science—or, more definitely, knowledge of the physical world with the aid of 
and in the sense of theoretical natural science —means the reduction of all change, in 
the physical world to movements of atoms produced independently of time by their 
central forces; or, in other words, natural science is the resolution of natural processes 
into the mechanics of atoms. It is a fact of psychological experience that, where such 
a resolution is practicable, our desire of tracing things back to their causes is 
provisionally satisfied (Du Bois-Reymond 1874, 17) 
 
– or of course the more recent genetic or molecular reductionism (crisply described by David 
Hull as follows: “both scientists and philosophers take ontological reduction for granted… 
Organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and that is that”, Hull 1981, 282). 
Why is the Darwinian-inspired form of reductionism different from the above cases? 
Because they all amount to so many “ontological commitments” in Quine’s sense (an 
ontological commitment means a commitment towards the existence of a particular set of 
objects: one thinker may believe in the existence of tables, chair but also mathematical 
entities as real, while another might ‘commit’ to all three of these plus unicorns, so that their 
respective commitments correspond to a type of statement which is only true if objects of 
this type exist; Quine 1961, 8, 12). The other forms of reductionism all are committed to a 
traditional distinction between the essential and the contingent, permanence and change … 
whereas theories founded on chance are by definition, anti-essentialist. 
Recall the comparison I sketched out above, between Kupiec’s Darwinian invocation 
of chance contra essences, and Althusser’s Lucretian invocation of the “random encounters” 
of molecules. One might object that the first is a scientific claim, in contrast to the second 
which is a philosophical usage of an ancient text – which itself seamlessly combined physics 
and metaphysics. But it seems that for Kupiec, as for Quine whom he does not mention, 
“ontology is part of the body of science itself and cannot be separated from it” (Quine 1961, 
45, note 20, quoting Meyerson 1908/1951). And in both cases, the Lucretian/Darwinian 
insistence on chance as explanatory has (philosophically) anti-essentialist consequences – 
what Dennett called a “universal acid” or a “universal solvent,” in the sense of a method that 
dissolves many of our naïve preconceptions about the world, the objects that inhabit it as 
well our place in it (Dennett 1995, 63f., 521). Of course, Dennett’s way of putting it keeps us 
in the safe zone where science is a reliable provider of truths (or practical regularities) and 
common sense or ‘folk psychology’ is like a naughty child that occasionally has to be called 
back to order. In contrast, there is a different kind of radicalism implicit in the Lucretian 
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project of “emptying the world of any substantiality, any necessity, any form that would be 
constitutive of its being –preventing any attempt to recreate a first philosophy” (Bourdin 
2005, 142). Granted, Kupiec’s target is not Plato or Descartes or Hegel, but rather a 
specifically biological essentialism. But, aside from the general Quinean point about the 
continuum on which both ontology and science are located, we can also specifically note that 
in dealing with the form/matter pair, the problem of ‘information’ and the dangers of the 
‘spiritualisation of matter’, metaphysics is never far off. 
 The ontophylogenetic theory (Kupiec 2009), in which chance is primary, seems 
closer to reductionism than to holism, as described so far. But it certainly seeks to find a 
‘third way’ between the two: 
Ontophylogenesis allows us to escape from the fetters created by these two types of 
theory in which biological thought has been trapped throughout its history; and if it 
provides this new perspective, it is because it totally renounces specificity to make 
room for probability. It does not depend on any principle of order which may be 
inherent in matter or given a priori. The organism is produced in its context by a non-
finalist process in which environmental constraints act on intrinsically probabilistic 
molecular and cellular mechanisms. (Kupiec 2009, 203)  
 
In a sense this is like a mirror image of what Leo Buss says in the preface to his book:  that 
he cannot understand why one cannot be a holist and a reductionist at the same time (Buss 
1987, vii, referring to John Tyler Bonner). Indeed, Buss was perhaps the first to observe that 
“The Modem Synthesis has not generated a theory of ontogeny” (Buss 1987, 25), and he 
argued for a kind of broadening of the Darwinian construct (different to Kupiec, whose 
radical, deflationary instincts steer him away from ‘holistic Darwinism’ and other odd 
constructs of the past 20 years of biological theory). Kupiec, despite his criticisms of genetic 
reductionism, is more ‘reduction-friendly’ than most of these thinkers seeking to expand the 
remit of Darwinism – be it through development, cultural evolution, niche selection or other 
means. 
 
5. 
One may ask at this point, what happens to the organism in this triangulation (where 
we seem to be moving in the direction of a kind of enhanced reductionism rather than 
holism)? At first, we get perhaps too strong a form of demystification (that is, reduction), 
with Kupiec’s frequent accusations of ‘animism’ – that holism is animistic in the sense that it 
attributes an inherent creative force or activity to matter itself – which risk losing sight, not 
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of the mysterious norganism or the organism as the bearer of an internal ‘subjectivity’ and 
‘temporality’ which remove from it from the physical world, but at the very least, of the 
functional integration of organisms. 
Consider the case of teleology. Kupiec wheels out the old, reliable war machine of 
the Scientific Revolution with its heroic demystification of the world and rejection of final 
causes (and animism, Kupiec 2009, 69). And it may be useful to dispel any residual concepts 
of a ‘finalistic’ teleology, which is often anthropomorphic, like that defended by the 
organismic biologist E.S. Russell:  
The organism strives to persist in its own being, and to reach its normal completion 
or actualization, This striving is not as a rule a conscious one, nor is there often any 
foresight of the end, but it exists all the same, as the very core of the organism’s 
being” (Russell 1950, 108, citing his own earlier work The Directedness of Organic 
Activities). 
 
But it is simple enough to defend a weaker form of teleology, in which – in a classic sort of 
example – the moth’s stripes or the polar bear’s colour can be teleologically described – in a 
weak teleological sense – as pointing to the camouflaging as leading to the (past) natural 
selection of their colour; not to a strong teleological claim that this camouflage predicts 
something about the future. And it seems dogmatic to reject the existence of a weaker sense 
of an inherent teleology in organisms, including their functional integration (Ruse 1989, 
1066). Surely Kupiec, as a Darwinian, could have allowed for at least as much as teleology 
in the biological world as Darwin did, not least given that if there is any teleology in 
Darwin’s world, “it is only because there is also a great deal of chance and accident in it” 
(Depew and Weber 1996, 147).  The argument against ‘animism’ is also too strong in the 
sense that it cannot do justice to the difference between organisational models (in the sense 
of Moreno et al.) as distinct from the more vitalistic, subjectivist models of organism like 
Varela’s, which, like Goldstein, privilege interiority over a ‘mere spatiality’ (patently 
obvious in Weber and Varela 2002, and Rudrauf et al. 2003), calling for “an expanded 
notion of the physical to account for the organism or living being” (Thompson 2007, 238). 
Organisational models, like Kupiec’s own ontophylogenesis, are not in the business of 
foundationalist ontological commitments.  
However, on the other hand we also get an interesting kind of residual vitalism (in 
the non-pejorative sense in which this term also applies to Claude Bernard, who after all is 
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something of a father figure in the analysis of ontophylogenesis). For Bernard knew how to 
play a double game, both reductionist and vitalist, depending on the level of analysis (Kupiec 
2009, sections 6.1, 6.2 ; Coleman 1985, on Bernard). Bernard could almost be a selfish-gene 
theorist when he says that “organs and systems do not exist for themselves, but for the cells, 
for the innumerable anatomical elements which comprise the organic edifice” (Bernard 
1879/1885, I, 358). The equivalent in Kupiec would be this anti-organicist statement: “there 
is no final aim in the organisation established of creating the organism for its own sake as an 
individual unit. It is the consequence of a process which ensures as best it can the life of 
cells” (Kupiec 2009, 124). But Bernard also has more vitalistic moments: 
[W]hat distinguishes a living machine is not the nature of its physico-chemical 
properties, complex as they may be, but rather the creation of the machine which 
develops under our eyes in conditions proper to itself and according to a definite idea 
which expresses the living being’s nature and the very essence of life (Bernard 
1865/1927, 93). 
 
The more Darwinian emphasis in Kupiec, like in Lewontin (or Dennett, or Dewey in their 
respective contexts) means that the question of ‘what is an organism?’ (or a “living machine” 
in Bernard’s terms) is non-operative. Neither the questions posed by the theory nor the types 
of answer it seeks for, involve definitions of what an organism is; there is no particular 
insistence, e.g., on the idea that organisms are integrated entities rather than collections of 
discrete objects (Gould and Lewontin 1979, 585). We are closer here to the processual 
character of Lewontin’s interactionism, as described above – where the organism is simply a 
place-holder for an intermediate location between various levels of a given system, including 
genes and environment. A more vitalist thinker would object here that by leaving ontology 
so far behind, we end up in a “night in which all cows are black” (Hegel 1807/1979, 9), like 
functionalism in the philosophy of mind, in which, as memorably expressed by its great 
defender Hilary Putnam, “we could be made of Swiss cheese and it wouldn’t matter” 
(Putnam 1975, 291; for some critical assessment of functionalism see Wolfe 2006). That is, 
we end with a biophysics, a computational model, a mathematical model rather than with an 
embodied analysis. 
 
 Conclusion 
The confrontation between chance, holism and reductionism – their triangulation, as I 
have called it, namely, the attempt to evaluate Kupiec’s new brand of Darwinism in terms of 
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its way of positioning itself with respect to these ‘families’ of theoretical positions, produces 
a de-essentialised vision of Nature in general and the status of living beings in particular, 
without however entirely overcoming the need to address the latter status. Most interesting 
perhaps is what happens to determinism here. For in the end, even if I initially noted the 
parallel between libertarianism, determinism and compatibilism on the one hand and their 
biological analogues (say, autopoiesis/organicism, genetic determinism and work such as 
Lewontin’s and Kupiec’s), what is really happening is a more subtle, more embodied 
reconstruction of certain components of determinism. 
Determinism is less strictly opposed to stochasticity than one often hears. As Levins 
and Lewontin note,“the entire development of molecular biology shows the continuing 
power of simple deterministic models of the ‘bête-machine’ nor is there the slightest reason 
to introduce stochasticity into models of, say, how an increase in adrenalin secretion will 
affect the concentration of sugar in the blood” (Levins and Lewontin 1980, 70); “thus 
stochastic processes may be the basis of deterministic process and deterministic the basis of 
stochastic. They do not exclude each other” (ibid., 72). But the sort of determinism at work 
in either Levins and Lewontin, or Kupiec is a far cry from Dawkins’ claim that we are 
“gigantic lumbering robots” programmed by our genes (Dawkins 1976, 21; useful discussion 
in Godfrey-Smith 2001).  Kupiec’s reappropriation of Darwinism away from the Modern 
Synthesis leads him to reject the ‘phenotype as expression of the genotype’ conception, in a 
way which injects Lucretian elements into the Darwinian framework. Similarly, the concept 
of reduction is still at work here, but not in such an ontologically strict sense; more as a 
heuristic (Gayon 2009/2011). Like Buss, he clearly feels that “the theory of evolution has 
never proven a static construct” (Buss 1987, 196). 
Conversely, chance is not just an ‘empty word’, a word “devoid of meaning” as 
classic determinists would have it (e.g. D’Holbach 1770/1990, II.v, 1587); it has more 
creativity attached and, perhaps, a kind of ontological reality (for discussion see Merlin 
2009/2011). Kupiec often insists that ‘cellular Darwinism’ is meant to break away from the 
opposition between holism and reductionism, between top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives. But this applies also to the equally venerable opposition between chance and 
                                                 
7
 D’Holbach (or Diderot, who is known to have contributed a good deal to the book) adds in a note to this 
passage, that “the molecules of matter may be compared to loaded dice, since they always produce certain pre-
determined effects; as these molecules vary essentially, in themselves and in their combinations, they are 
loaded in infinitely various ways” (D’Holbach 1770/1990, 159, note 41). 
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determinism, which in some cases is a false dichotomy (Wolfe 2010c). For what looks like 
order at one level of organisation may look like disorder at another level; “notions such as 
those of ‘direction,’ ‘organization’ or ‘randomness’ should be explicitly relativized to the 
unit in a hierarchy where they become relevant” (Falk and Sarkar 1992, 470). To be clear,  I 
am not claiming that what we learn here is a ‘new theory of chance’; rather, it is an anti-
essentialist vision of organisms or living systems which navigates between various excesses 
(holism and reductionism), using an appeal to chance, stochasticity and generally Darwinian 
concepts as a background. 
Lastly, what I’ve called the Lucretian elements in Kupiec’s Darwinism also explain 
its deliberate demystifying tone, challenging our anthropomorphic conceptions – of what a 
species is (following Darwin) or even an individual, over which there is after all so little 
consensus. This challenging aspect matches up with what Dennett called the “universal acid” 
aspect of evolutionary theory, which, oddly enough, Hans Jonas had also noted, a generation 
earlier – and in his conceptual world this became “existentialism”: “nineteenth-century 
evolutionism, which completed the Copernican revolution in ontology, is an apocryphal 
ancestor (along with the more official ones) of present-day existentialism” (Jonas 1966, 47). 
Indeed, Dennett too acknowledges that evolutionary theory can have the effect of making 
most of our intuitions about life seem absurd (Dennett 1995, 153). But whether we identify 
this type of thinking as Lucretian, Darwinian, or existentialist, we should clearly see its 
challenge to hyper-rationalist or architectonic conceptions of order. 
Recall Kupiec’s point that both reductionism (specifically, genetic determinism) and 
holism posit “a first principle . . . which structures the world and directs processes,” a 
“principle of order” (Kupiec 2009, 77). Contemplating Kupiec’s work today, I am reminded 
of Goethe’s rather pitiful confession of fear, faced with the (Lucretian) anarchy of Diderot’s 
world – he doubtless would have felt the same about Darwin; and today about Kupiec. 
Reacting to the materialist Diderot (who he also admired, and whose novel Le Neveu de 
Rameau he translated into German), Goethe, thinker of morphogenesis, Urpflanze and a 
hierarchy in Nature, wrote: “Astonishing and excellent Diderot, why always use your great 
intellectual powers to produce disorder rather than order?” (Goethe 1798/1998; Goethe 1996, 
196). This disorder is that of the living world in its unpredictability – teratological, 
transformist, classically-Darwinian or cellular-Darwinian. 
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